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Abstract
This paper analyzes a War of Attrition where players enjoy private information about their
outside opportunities. The main message is that uncertainty about the possibility that the
opponent opts out increases the equilibrium probability of concession.
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The aim of this paper is to study the role played by outside options in
negotiations when there is incomplete information about their existence. For
this purpose we focus our analysis on the War of Attrition since this is the
simplest model of con°ict that yields ine±cient equilibria under conditions
of complete information. It is well known that, in a symmetric War of
Attrition without outside options, the unique symmetric equilibrium consists
of players randomizing at a constant probability between conceding and not
conceding, a very ine±cient outcome indeed1. We show that the presence of
uncertain outside options increases the equilibrium probability of concession.
The relevance of outside opportunities available to the players on the
outcome of a negotiation has been well established in models of bargain-
ing with complete information (Shaked and Sutton (1984), Binmore et al.
(1986), Shaked (1987), and Ponsati and S¶ akovics (1998)). Considering un-
certainty about outside options is a natural extension of this literature that
deserves attention2. In this paper we present a model where players enjoy
private information about their possibilities of opting out, but they do not
know their opponent's opportunities.
We show that introducing the possibility of opting out in a War of At-
trition has a signi¯cant e®ect on the outcomes. We ¯nd that, on the one
hand, if the probability of facing an opponent who has an outside option
is su±ciently high, in equilibrium, the negotiation will surely end at some
future date. On the other hand, if the likelihood of that kind of opponent
is low, types that have outside opportunities eventually opt out with prob-
ability 1, leaving types with no outside options to play, from that time on,
the symmetric ine±cient equilibrium of the complete information War of
Attrition. Even in this case, the probability of concession increases in the
uncertainty phase of the equilibrium play.
The following section presents the model and characterizes equilibria of
this game. Conclusions are presented in the last section.
2. The model
Two players bargain about how to share one unit of surplus that will be
available only when they reach an agreement. An agreement is denoted by
x; where x indicates the portion of the surplus assigned to player 1. There
are only two possible agreements; either x = 1¡a or x = a with 0 < a < 1
2.
1See Hendricks, K., A. Weiss and C. Wilson (1988).
2See Vislie (1988) and Ponsat¶ ³ and S¶ akovics (2001).
1Players may also decide to break the negotiation by opting out, in which
case, they receive a payo® bi i = 1;2.
The game is played in discrete time, starting at t = 0. At each time
(a stage), both players decide simultaneously either: (i) to propose her pre-
ferred agreement, or (ii) to concede by proposing her opponent's favorite
agreement or (iii) to leave the negotiation and opt out. The game ends
whenever a player or both, at the same time, concedes or opts out. Other-
wise, disagreement occurs, discounting applies and the game proceeds to a
new stage.
Players are assumed to be risk neutral and impatient. Their impatience
is modeled by a common discount factor, normalized to be ± per unit of
time. And the payo®s are as follows: if players perpetually disagree, they
both receive zero payo®. If only player i concedes at time t, then player i
gets a±t and player j gets (1 ¡ a)±t. If both players concede at the same
time3each player gets a±t. And if either or both players opt out, payo®s are
bi±t for i = 1;2:
Each player i has private information about the value of her outside
opportunity, which can be either bi = 0 or bi = b, a < b < 1 ¡ a. A player
with no outside option (or whose outside option is 0) is a weak type, denoted
as W; and a player with an outside option b > 0 is a strong type, denoted as
S. Strong types always prefer opting out rather than conceding and weak
types prefer conceding rather than opting out. The players entertain beliefs
about each other's type and they are represented by an initial probability
0 < ¼i
0 < 1, that is, the probability that player i is weak. We assume that
these probabilities are common knowledge and we set ¼i
0 = ¼0 for simplicity.
Since we are interested in the role played by outside options on the out-
come of the War of Attrition, we ¯nd appropriate to examine the Symmet-
ric Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (SPBE) of this game given that ine±ciency
arises in a War of Attrition when players are constrained to use symmetric
strategies. A strategy ¾i(¿) of player i with type ¿ = W;S is de¯ned as







t(¿) is the probabil-
ity of conceding at t and ¯i
t(¿) is the probability of opting out at t, given




t = ®t and ¯i
t = ¯
j
t = ¯t. We denote as ¼i
t the belief that player i is
weak given that no player either concedes or opts out before t.
Since in a SPBE a weak type will never opt out and a tough type will
3This assumption is computationally convenient. Results do not change substantially
if we assume that, when both players concede at the same time, a lottery is used to decide
the outcome.
2never concede, in an abuse of terminology, we will identify the probabilities
of conceding ®t with the strategy of the weak type, and the probabilities of
opting out ¯t with the strategy of the strong type. The ¯rst result is quite
straightforward. All detailed proofs are relegated to the appendix.
There is no SPBE in pure strategies.
We next turn attention to pro¯les where players randomize. In a SPBE in
mixed strategies, it must be true that the payo® of conceding at t, conditional
on the opponent not having conceded or opted out previously, must be equal
to the expected payo® of conceding at t + 1. At the same time, the payo®
of opting out at t, conditional on the opponent not having yielded before,
must be equal to the expected payo® of opting out at t + 1:
a = (1 ¡ a)¼t®t + a±(1 ¡ ¼t®t ¡ (1 ¡ ¼t)¯t);
b = (1 ¡ a)¼t®t + b(1 ¡ ¼t)¯t + b±(1 ¡ ¼t®t ¡ (1 ¡ ¼t)¯t); (1)




¼t¡1(1 ¡ ®t¡1) + (1 ¡ ¼t¡1)(1 ¡ ¯t¡1)
. (2)
Next lemma points out that, in a SPBE it is not possible to have both
types yielding at the same time with probability 1. And if the equilibrium
is such that weak types concede with probability 1 at some t, then strong





0 are SPBE, then:
(i) there is no t such that ®t = ¯t = 1
(ii) If ®t = 1 and 0 < ¯t < 1 then ¯t+1 = 1:
In this game, the equilibrium strategies are characterized by the pair of
di®erence equations (1). To simplify notation let,
H =
ab(1 ¡ ±)
a±(1 ¡ a ¡ ±b) + b(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ a ¡ ±a)
G =
(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ a)(b ¡ a)
a±(1 ¡ a ¡ ±b) + b(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ a ¡ ±a)
.
Substituting these expressions on (1) and (2), and solving the corre-










1 ¡ H ¡ G
¶t
: (3)
In what follows, we analyze di®erent pro¯les that can be sustained as
equilibria.
32.1. Concession Equilibria
A Concession Strategy Pro¯le is a strategy pro¯le where weak types
eventually concede with probability 1. De¯ne T as the natural number that
solves:
H
H+G + (¼0 ¡ H
H+G)( 1
1¡H¡G)t · H · H
H+G + (¼0 ¡ H
H+G)( 1
1¡H¡G)t¡1.
In a Concession Equilibrium, as time passes, players become more pes-
simistic about their opponents being a weak type. That fact will naturally
a®ect the probability of conceding ®t which increases over time and the prob-
ability of opting out ¯t which decreases. At some time t = T the probability
that her opponent is strong is so high that a weak type optimally concedes
with probability 1 since the chance of receiving her preferred agreement is
too small. And a strong type will opt out at T +1 with probability 1, since
waiting until period T + 2 discounts her payo® and provides no additional
probability that a weak type will make a concession. The formal statement
of this result follows:
If ¼0 2 (0;H]; there is a unique SPBE such that ®t = ¯t+1 = 1 for
all time t and ¯0 =
b(1¡±)¡¼0(1¡a¡±b)


























´t¸; for t · T;
®t = ¯t+1 = 1 for t ¸ T
2.2 Opting Out Equilibria
An Opting Out Pro¯le is characterized by strong types taking their out-
side opportunities at some time with probability 1, leaving weak types to
play as in the complete information War of Attrition from that time on.
De¯ne as T the natural number that solves
H
H+G + (¼0 ¡ H
H+G)( 1
1¡H¡G)t¡1 · 1 ¡ G · H




























´t¸; for t < T;
¯t = 1 and ®t+1 =
a(1 ¡ ±)
1 ¡ a ¡ ±a
for t ¸ T:





for t ¸ 1.
In an Opting Out Equilibrium, weak types place a small probability of
conceding at each period. The posterior of facing a weak type opponent
¼t increases over time, but the probability ®t that weak types concede de-
creases. In equilibrium, there will be some time t = T such that the optimal
concession probability of the weak types cannot induce strong types to stay
in the game beyond T since the payo® they get by opting out at that time, b,
is greater than the expected payo® of waiting an additional period for (1¡a).
After T the posterior probability of facing a weak opponent is 1. Players
that are still at the negotiation table identify themselves as weak types and
thus, from that period T on, they play the Symmetric Perfect Equilibrium
of the complete information War of Attrition without outside options. In





The next proposition establishes the unique combination of parameters
for which the SPBE is pooling. Players follow strategies such that both types
randomize at the same constant rate between yielding and not yielding.
If ¼0 = H
H+G; the unique SPBE is ®t = ¯t = H + G; for t ¸ 0:
If the probability of facing a weak opponent is exactly ¼0 = H
H+G, in
equilibrium, both types remain indi®erent between conceding and opting
out at every time. That is, in terms of randomized strategies, each player
believes, at each time, that the probabilities (®t;¯t) that the opponent con-
cedes or opts out at subsequent times are exactly so as to make continuation
marginally worthwhile. No information is revealed along this equilibrium.
No player updates her beliefs about the weakness of her opponent since if
5players concede and opt out at each time with the same probability, the
posterior ¼t is constant over time.
3. Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the e®ect of the private information about
outside options on the outcomes of negotiations. In order to address this
issue we analyzed a War of Attrition allowing players to leave the negotiation
in order to opt out and we characterized the Symmetric Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of this game. There are two types of players: a weak type
who has a valueless outside option-she always prefers conceding rather than
opting out- and a strong type who has a valuable outside option that she
prefers to take rather than conceding. We show that uncertainty about the
possibility that the opponent opts out increases the equilibrium probability
of concession. More precisely, if the probability that the opponent is strong
is relatively high, in equilibrium, the negotiation eventually ends with a sure
concession. On the other extreme, if the likelihood of a weak opponent is
high, strong types stay in the game for a while and eventually leave the
negotiation and opt out with probability 1. From that date on, weak types
play the (ine±cient) symmetric equilibrium of the classical War of Attrition
with complete information. Even in this case, the probability of concession
by weak types along the uncertainty phase of the equilibrium play increases.
6Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
De¯ne t¿ ¿ = W;S as a time at which type ¿ plans to yield (to concede
if she is weak and to opt out otherwise) given than no player yields before
that time. Assume ¯rst that tS · tW. Thus, strong types know that, in
equilibrium, weak types do not concede before they opt out with certainty.
Then, it is optimal for a strong type to opt out at period 0, so she avoids any
discounting of the payo®. The same happens to a weak type, since she knows
she is not going to get any concession from her opponent. Thus, it must be
tW = tS = 0. But this cannot be an equilibrium since b < (1¡a)¼0+b(1¡¼0).
The other potential equilibrium is tW < tS in which case tW = 0 and
tS = x with x ¸ 1. If weak types concede in equilibrium at t = 0, then







1¡a¡±b, strong types deviate and opt out at t = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Statement (i) indicates that, in equilibrium, it is not possible that both
types yield, at the same time, with probability 1. If the strategy of the
opponent is to concede and to opt out at some t with probability 1, then
a strong player will have always incentives to wait one period since b <
(1 ¡ a)¼t + b(1 ¡ ¼t), breaking the symmetry of the strategies.
Statement (ii) establishes that, if the weak type strategy is to concede
with probability 1 at some period t, then to opt out at t+1 dominates doing
so in t+2, since waiting until period t+2 discounts their payo® and provides
no additional probability that a weak type will make a concession.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the equation (3) that rules the posterior. If ¼0 < H
H+G, ¼t
decreases over time and, thus ®t =
H
¼t
increases. At some period T, ®t
reaches the value of 1. Then, it must be true that ¼T¡1®T¡1 = H; and
¼T®T · H. Since ®T = 1 and ®T¡1 < 1 then ¼T¡1 ¸ H ¸ ¼T. Using the
equation (3), T is the natural number that solves:
H
H+G + (¼0 ¡ H
H+G)( 1
1¡H¡G)t · H · H
H+G + (¼0 ¡ H
H+G)( 1
1¡H¡G)t¡1:
By lemma 2 we know that if ®T = 1 then ¯T+1 = 1. Notice that if ¼0 · H,
then T = 0.
7Proof of Proposition 4
If H
H+G < ¼0 < 1¡G; then ¼t increases over time and ¯t increases until,
at some time T, it reaches the value of 1. Then it must be the case that
(1 ¡ ¼T¤
H¡1)¯T¡1 = G; and (1 ¡ ¼T)¯T · G. Since ¯T = 1 and ¯T¡1 < 1;
then 1 ¡ ¼T¡1 ¸ G ¸ 1 ¡ ¼T. Using the equation (3), T is the natural
number that solves:
H
H+G + (¼0 ¡ H
H+G)( 1
1¡H¡G)t¡1 · 1 ¡ G · H
H+G + (¼0 ¡ H
H+G)( 1
1¡H¡G)t:
Since ¯T = 1, then ¼t = 1 for t ¸ T + 1. Players that are still playing are
weak types and thus ®t =
a(1¡±)
1¡a¡±a for t > T + 1.
If 1¡G 6 ¼0, T = 0 and thus ¼t = 1 for t ¸ 1. We substitute ¯t = 1 for
t ¸ 0 and ®0 =
a(1 ¡ ±¼0)
(1 ¡ a ¡ ±a)¼0
®t =
a(1 ¡ ±)
1 ¡ a ¡ ±a
for t ¸ 1 in the following
equations:
b > ¼t®t(1 ¡ a) + b(1 ¡ ¼t)¯t + b±(1 ¡ ¼t®t ¡ (1 ¡ ¼t)¯t)
a = ¼t®t(1 ¡ a) + a±(1 ¡ ¼t®t ¡ (1 ¡ ¼t)¯t)
and easily check that are satis¯ed for all t only if ¼0 ¸ 1 ¡ G.
Proof of Proposition 5
Substituting ¼0 = H




and ¯t = G
1¡¼0 = H + G for t ¸ 0.
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